Reply by Boonin-Vail, David
Robinson: Commentary 
"I'd be a better person if I weren't turned on by 
these pictures; after all, the personalities, which are 
what really ought to count in eroticism, are not 
represented." We can also imagine an erotophobe 
who thinks 'These are natural human activities, I 
would be a better person if I related more positively 
to this material." That is, morality may crosscut the 
witnessing reaction. Again, it is only the analogue 
of the witnessing reaction that is properly included 
in the contractors' deliberations. 
2 The question arises whether the suggested way of 
maintaining a distinction between the cases of animals and 
marginal humans can be attributed to Carruthers. It is true 
that he does not crisply distinguish content of principies from 
type of justification and type of attitude that goes with them. 
Nonetheless, I think (but shall not argue in any detail) that 
my discussion is quite in accord with Carruthers' views. I 
note that in P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), the pages from 110 to 
118, which deal mostly with marginal humans, are filled with 
talk about rights. The section on animals and character (pp. 
153-156) is, by contrast, focused upon cruelty and sympathy. 
A notable exception occurs near the beginning of p. 154. Here, 
however, the kind of wrongness that cruelty to animals has, 
and that is to be further discussed in this section, is explicitly 
contrasted with Violation of rights. 
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I take the general thesis of Professor Robinson's 
comments to be this: in conceding so much to Carruthers 
for the sake of the argument, I have provided the 
contractarian with sufficient grounds on which to 
overcome the initially plausible-looking objections I 
have raised (or at least I have failed to show that I 
haven't provided such grounds). In keeping with the 
spirit of his comments, then, I will limit myself here to 
the narrow question of whether Robinson has succeeded 
in hoisting me not so much with my own petard, as 
with the one I have tentatively accepted on loan from 
the contractarian. 
I. 
My first argument maintained that if the contracting 
agents would decide to avoid the risk ofbeing distressed 
by the sight of animals suffering for trivial reasons in 
public, then they would also decide to avoid the risk of 
being distressed by their knowledge that animals are 
suffering for trivial reasons in private. Robinson's 
objection, I think, can best be summarized in the form 
ofa dilemma: either I am relying on there being a moral 
aversion to this suffering, in which case I am reneging 
on my commitment to argue the issue on the 
contractarian's own terms, or I am appealing to a 
nonmoral aversion, in which case I have failed to 
account for the fact that, in general, what is done out of 
sight is less emotionally distressing than what is done 
in full view. 
I will focus on the first hom of the dilemma and 
make a brief comment about the second. With respect 
to the first, I think that there is a way for me to appeal 
to the existence of a moral aversion to private animal 
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suffering while retaining my commitment to arguing 
on Carruthers' own terms. Robinson argues that the 
contractors themselves cannot have a moral repugnance 
to factory farming (or to anything else). And on this 
point he is surely correct. But even if qua contractors 
they can have no such repugnance, they may still worry 
that after the veil of ignorance is lifted they will find 
themselves to be people who do find factory farming 
morally repugnant, and so from behind the veil they 
can worry that outside of the veil they will be morally 
distressed by it. 
Now this strategy may at first seem simply to beg 
the question against Carruthers all over again, but I 
believe that it does not: Carruthers has argued, after 
all, that many people do feel sympathy for animals, and 
that those who do can "easily" come to believe that 
animal suffering has moral standing (p. 157). Carruthers 
himself argues that this belief is an "illusion," to be 
sure, but he has also insisted that when deliberating from 
behind the veil of ignorance the contractors must take 
into account how the principles they consider "might 
be distorted or abused" (p. lIS). In response to 
Robinson's observation, then, I suggest that the 
contractors in question must consider that in endorsing 
a character which is sympathetic to animal suffering, 
they are endorsing a character which makes it likely 
that many people will come (albeit distortedly) to 
believe that animal suffering is morally important, and 
so to be morally repelled by factory farming. As a 
contractor, then, I do have reason to worry that I will 
be morally distressed by factory farming once I get 
beyond the veil, even though as a contractor behind the 
veil I am not morally distressed by it or by anything else. 
A brief remark about the second horn of the 
dilemma: although I can't defend the claim here, I 
suspect that the suffering that an animal is typically 
subjected to in a factory farm is far greater than the 
sort of suffering which, when seen in public, suffices 
to generate a nonmoral emotional aversion. While we 
are more distressed by seeing· a dog kicked than by 
knowing that one is being kicked, then, we may be 
more or less equally distressed by seeing a dog kicked 
and by knowing about the far more serious harms being 
done to veal calves or intensely farmed chickens. An 
emotional, nonmoral aversion to the knowledge of 
such suffering, then, may suffice for my purposes 
even given the fact that, all things being equal, what 
is done out of sight is less distressing than what is 
done in plain view. 
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H. 
My second argument maintained, to follow Robinson's 
useful terminology, that if contracting agents would 
agree to criticize the character trait of brutality, and thus 
to condemn the sorts of acts which arise from it, then 
they would for the same reason agree to condemn the 
character trait of trivial indifference, and thus to 
condemn those who support factory farming from it. 
To this Robinson replies that while we can certainly 
agree that trivial indifference to animal suffering is a 
moral flaw, we cannot allow the contracting agents 
themselves to believe this, and he adds that it seems 
plausible to suppose that contractors would in fact have 
substantially less to fear from those who are trivially 
indifferent toward animals than from those who are 
brutal toward them. 
I think I can accept both of these observations. 
Carruthers gives as examples of actions which he takes 
to be shown to be wrong by his account both the driver 
who hits a dog with his car for fun, and the driver who 
after accidentally hitting a dog with his car, considers 
stopping to help the dog but decides not to because he 
is late for an appointment with his barber (p. 154). 
Now it seems to me open to Carruthers to say both 
that the contractors themselves would not believe that 
either person was morally flawed and that they would 
have more to fear from the first sort of person than 
from the second. Still, provided that they would just 
as soon not have to count on getting help when they 
need it from the second sort of person either, the 
contractors would have reason to criticize that sort of 
person as well. The second person allows the animal 
to suffer out of a motive that is trivial, and my 
suggestion was, and remains, that this is what people 
do by supporting factory farming. 
HI. 
My final argument maintained that if marginal humans 
have full moral standing for the reasons that Carruthers 
provides, then so do animals. Robinson considers this 
to be the most important of my arguments, so it will 
come as something ofan anti-climax for me to conclude 
by saying that on this issue I believe we are essentially 
in agreement. Nonetheless, I do believe that on this issue 
we are essentially in agreement. 
The reason that this is not immediately apparent, I 
think, lies in a confusion in Carruthers' terminology. 
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Carruthers begins his book with the following 
statement: 
The task of this book is to consider whether 
animals have moral standing -that is, 
whether they have rights that we may infringe 
by killing them or causing them suffering, or 
whether there is some other way in which we 
have direct moral duties towards them (p. 1). 
Now it is true, as I noted in my paper, that Canuthers 
often uses the expression "full moral standing" rather 
than just "moral standing," but he seems to use them 
interchangeably. At one point in the preface he says he 
will "defend a theoretical framework that accords fUll 
moral standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily 
withholding such standing from animals," but the passage 
continues with the very next sentence beginning, "In 
attacking those who attribute moral standing to 
animals ... ," as if he means to be denying the claim that 
animals have any moral standing at all (p. xii). 
The question, then, is this: does denying that 
animals have full moral standing commit one to 
denying that they have any moral standing at all? In 
one sense, the answer is no. This is the sense whicb 
refers to the content of the duties we may have toward 
them. We might have some duties to animals but not 
the full list of duties that we have toward marginal 
humans. This is the sense that Robinson focuses on, 
and I accept his conclusion that contractors would 
accept more restrictions on their treatment ofmarginal 
humans than on their treatment of animals. In this 
sense, the moral status of marginal humans would be 
"more full" than the moral status of animals. 
But in another sense, the answer is yes. In this 
sense, having moral standing means being a possessor 
of rigbts or an object of direct moral importance, and 
this property does not come in degrees: one either has 
it or does not have it. My moral standing cannot be 
more fully direct than yours, though I can be the object 
of more direct duties than you are; even if you have 
more rights than I do, I have the rights that I do have 
just as fully as you have the rights that you have. 
This is the sense in which I deny that Carruthers' 
argument succeeds. I take Carruthers to be arguing that 
animals are of no direct moral significance, that they 
possess no rights at all, not just that they possess fewer 
rights than marginal humans do. This is certainly how 
Carruthers' publisher is pitching the book. The copy 
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on the back of the cover begins: "Do animals bave 
rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the 
animal rights movement, whose opinion bas held moral 
sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that 
they do not" (one wonders where all this swaying has 
been taking place; certainly not in most of the 
philosophy departments I am familiar with). My claim 
is that if marginal humans have rights, then so do 
animals, even if they don't have all the same rights. 
And so, in this sense, their moral status is the same. 
Now this conclusion, to be sure, may not be strong 
enough to satisfy the aforementioned animal rights 
"gurus," but, to reiterate (and to conclude), my point here 
bas not been to recommend moral contraetarianism to 
these gurus, but rather to suggest that it does not serve 
their opponents as well as Carruthers claims it does. 
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